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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the central role of computerised code in shaping the social and 
geographical politics of inequality in advanced societies. The central argument is 
that, whilst such processes are necessarily multi-faceted, multiscaled, complex and 
ambivalent, a wide variety of ‘software-sorting’ techniques are now being widely 
applied in efforts to try and separate privileged and marginalised groups and places 
across a wide range of sectors and domains. This paper’s central demonstration is 
that the overwhelming bulk of software-sorting applications are closely associated 
with broader transformations from Keynesian to neoliberal service regimes.  To 
illustrate such processes of software-sorting, the paper analyses recent research 
addressing three examples of software-sorting in practice. These address physical 
and electronic mobility systems, online Geographical Information Systems (GIS), and 
face-recognition Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems covering city streets. The 
paper finishes by identifying  theoretical, research and policy implications of the 
diffusion of software-sorted geographies within which computerised code continually 
orchestrates inequalities through technological systems embedded within urban 
environments. 
 
Key Words 
 
Code    Software-Sorting    Surveillance   Unbundling   Inequality   Remediation   
Mobilities   Geodemographics   CCTV 
3 
I Introduction: Code and the Remediation of Inequality 
 
"The modern city exists as a haze of software instructions"  
(Amin and Thrift, 2003, 125). 
 
“Values, opinions and rhetoric are frozen into code"  
(Bowker and Star, 1999, 35) 
 
 
Computer software mediates, saturates and sustains contemporary capitalist 
societies. Enrolled into complex technoscientific and machinic systems, stretched 
across time-space, a vast universe of code provides the hidden background to the 
functioning and ordering of such societies (Lessig, 1999). The flows, mobilities, and 
transactions; the folded geographies of inclusion and exclusion; the construction, 
consumption and experience of place; the very operation of distanciated webs of 
production, distribution, and consumption – all, very literally, are now performed -- at 
least in part -- through the continuous agency of vast realms of computer software.  
 
With computerised systems now actually becoming the ‘ordinary’ socio-technical 
world in many contemporary societies (Amin and Thrift, 2002), code orchestrates a 
widening array of public, private, and public-private spheres and mobility, logistics 
and service systems and spaces. This new “calculative background that is currently 
coming into existence,” as Nigel Thrift describes it, (2004a, 582) is based on 
ubiquitous, pervasive, inter-linked arrays of computerised spaces, systems, and 
equipment which increasingly blend seamlessly into the wider urban environment 
(Cuff, 2002). Such technosocial complexes of code, and their supportive hardware 
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and organizational systems,  have variously been described in terms of a kind of 
‘immanent domain’ (Cuff, 2002), ‘ubiquitous computing’ (Hunter, 2002), an ‘invisible 
city’ (Latour and Hermand, 1998), a ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 
2000), or a proliferating array of ‘Automated Socio-Technical Environments’ (Lianos 
and Douglas, 2000). However one describes them, code-based technologised 
environments continuously and invisibly classify, standardise, and demarcate rights, 
privileges, inclusions, exclusions, and mobilities and normative social judgements 
across vast, distanciated, domains (Graham and Wood, 2003, Bowler and Star, 
1999, Thrift, 2004b, Thrift and French, 2002).  
 
Given all this, it is curious that remarkably little attention had been paid to "the 
millions of lines of code that have come to run cities as computing power has 
increased and as many former bodily practices have been written into code" (Amin 
and Thrift, 2002, 125). What Nigel Thrift and Shaun French (2002, 309) term the 
automatic production of space, through the simultaneous enaction of multiple, 
interacting worlds of computer software, remains largely ignored in human 
geography and social science more generally. Sunk in the taken for granted 
background of everyday life, these worlds of code exert their power over the 
geographies and lifeworlds of capitalism continuously and powerfully, but with 
scarcely any analytical or day-to-day scrutiny. This invisibility contrasts markedly with 
the burgeoning library of volumes  which now exist addressing the connections 
between new technologies and urban life more generally (Graham, 2004a).  Thus, it 
seems, "code is in some sense invisible compared with its computer carapace" 
(Amin and Thrift, 2003, 125). 
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As the opaque and esoteric worlds of code operate to directly shape the practices 
and possibilities of everyday life in ever extending ways, so the analytical challenge 
is thus to excavate the worlds of code as critical political, social and geographical 
sites requiring urgent understanding, regulation and intervention. "Software 
challenges us to understand new forms of technologies politics and new practices of 
political invention, legibility and intervention that we are only beginning to 
comprehend as political at all" (Thrift an French, 2002, 331).  
 
Encouragingly, a range of recent work in geography, sociology, technology studies 
and allied disciplines, is starting to make real progress in unearthing the ways in 
which contemporary capitalist societies are continuously brought into being through 
code. Such work reflects a broad shift in social scientific analyses of new media and 
information technologies. Here, attention has turned away from discussions 
suggesting that such technologies offer access to some ‘virtual’ domain which is 
somehow distinct and separable, in some binary way, from  the ‘real’ spaces and 
places of cities and material urban life (Woolgar, 2002). In their place, much more 
nuanced and sophisticated approaches are emerging. These stress that new 
technologies are intimately involved in the fine-grained and subtle transformations, or 
‘remediations’, of place-and space-based social worlds (Bolter and Grusin, 2000, 
Graham, 2004a,b, Haythornwaite and Wellman, 2002). Far from being separated 
domains, then, such perspectives underline that the coded worlds of the ‘virtual’ 
actually work to continually constitute, structure, and facilitate the place-based 
practices of the material world (Dodge and Kitchen, 2004a, 198).   Castells (1996, 
373) calls this the shift from ‘virtual reality’ to ‘real virtuality’ (see Dodge and Kitchin, 
2004a). 
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical review of  emerging work on the 
relationships between the worlds of code and human geography. This is undertaken 
as a means of taking stock of this emerging body of work and to suggest directions 
for future research. The specific focus here is on the ways in which software code 
actively shapes and structures social and geographical inequalities within and 
between places in a wide variety of ways. In what follows, I review emerging 
research which addresses three particularly important domains where social and 
economic inequalities within and between places are directly mediated, and shaped, 
by hidden worlds of code. These address, in turn: spaces of physical and electronic 
mobility, the production and consumption of urban neighbourhoods via online 
Geographical Information Systems (or GIS), and the growth of facial recognition 
based Closed Circuit Television (or CCTV) covering city streets. Before reviewing 
these three bodies of work, however, it is necessary to place coded geographies of 
inclusion and exclusion within their wider political economic contexts.  
 
II  ‘One Person’s Infrastructure is Another’s Difficulty’:  
Software-Sorting and Political Economies of ‘Unbundling’ 
 
To capture the ways in which software code mediates contemporary social worlds 
automatically (i.e. with little immediate human supervision), with very little delay (i.e. 
in real time), and continuously, I coin the term ‘software-sorting’ (Graham, 2004c). 
Software-sorting is a critical landscape of power within what Jeremy Rifkin (2001) 
has termed the ‘age of access’. Rifkin uses this term to describe the way in which 
individual and collective life chances are shaped increasingly  by their treatment 
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within computer-controlled, customised, service domains. These, Rifkin argues, are 
increasingly orchestrated through technological networks which are structured  to 
operate automatically using consumerist criteria. Such systems enrol selected, 
privileged users whilst precisely controlling access for those deemed unprofitable, 
risky, or deviant.  
 
Software-sorting is the means through such selective access is organised (Graham 
and Wood, 2003). Such processes operate  through a vast universe of what Michel 
Callon (1986) has termed ‘obligatory passage points’. These are particular 
topological spaces within socio-technical systems through which actors have to 
‘pass’ in order that the system actually functions in the way that dominant actors 
desire. The obligatory passage points within software-sorting systems involve a 
burgeoning array of subscriptions, passwords, service entitlements, physical and 
virtual access control points, electronically surveilled passage-points and transaction 
systems, automated, biometric judgements, and normative databases  -- all of which 
are  continuously enacted and sustained through code and computerised systems 
based on machine-readable inputs (see Lyon, 2003a, Dodge and Kitchen, 2004b). 
 
The term software-sorting captures the crucial and often ignored role of code in 
directly, automatically, and continuously  allocating social or geographical access to 
all sorts of critical goods, services, life chances, or mobility opportunities to certain 
social groups or geographical areas, often at the direct expense of others (Lyon, 
2003b). It is crucial to stress, then, that the ‘mobile publics’ inhabiting the extending 
neoliberal geographies of flow and access that are the focus of so much recent work 
in geography, anthropology, and sociology (Lyon, 2003b, Sheller, 2004, Cresswell, 
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2001), are publics that are often prioritised, enacted, and kept apart, by hidden 
worlds of software-sorting. 
 
Crucially, however, the links between software-sorting and geographical inequalities 
are inherently  complex, ambivalent and ambiguous. This is for at least five reasons. 
First, the geographical and social configurations  of software-sorted service or 
mobility systems vary dramatically and may support or entail diverse restructuring 
dynamics.  As the next section of this paper underlines, such techniques facilitate a 
wide range of restructuring and innovation processes across a very wide range of 
service and material domains and spatial scales. Whilst there may be similarities, 
each of these will have its own particular social and geographical configurations and 
dynamics.  
 
Second, the application of software-sorting systems is far from being some simple, 
deterministic, or one-dimensional technological  or political-economic shift. Attempts 
at  using software-sorting techniques to support the separation or secession of 
certain groups from wider, more public, domains, for example, are never simple, ‘top-
down’ and dualistic. Transgressions of categories are almost always possible; 
asserted boundaries are almost always porous to some extent (see, for example, 
Bloomfield, 2001).  
 
Third, the application of software-sorting techniques is never simply about the 
structuring and maintenance of social and geographical inequalities per se. They are 
also often closely enrolled into wider processes of identity  and difference 
9 
(re)formation, as processes of consumption are shaped and enrolled by subjects to 
support wider constructions of  place, difference, mobility and identity.  
 
Fourth, and as we shall see in this paper’s conclusions, software-sorting techniques 
are nothing of not flexible: they can be shaped to sustain highly empowering, 
progressive, and environmentally positive service innovations as well as highly 
regressive ones.  
 
Finally, it is important to remember that complex inequalities were always a feature 
of the service regimes that pre-dated the introduction of  software-sorting techniques. 
The discursive egalitarianism that  tended to characterise Keynesian or monopolistic 
service  and infrastructure regimes, for example, often tended to contrast sharply 
with their highly unequal material effects ‘on the ground’  (Graham and Marvin, 
2001). So we should be careful not to romanticise or over-emphasise the egalitarian 
achievements of  the modern, Keynesian models of service and infrastructure 
provision, based on electromechanical technologies and  bureaucratic information 
systems, that are being complemented or replaced by software-sorted systems.  
 
Whilst taking these caveats on board, this paper demonstrates that a particularly 
important feature of the current wave of  software-sorting applications is their direct 
enrollment to help restructure and recommodify many previously ‘public’ domains of 
everyday life and material culture  within western capitalist nations. Whilst they are 
inherently multitudinous, diverse and ambivalent,  and operate and multiple scales. 
the predominant dynamic of contemporary software-sorting innovations seems to be 
linked closely to the elaboration of neoliberal models of state construction and 
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service provision (Graham and Marvin, 2001).  Without software-sorting techniques, 
for example, many major infrastructural and material transformations, based on the 
application of neoliberal political paradigms  and ideologies to a wide range of social 
and economic contexts, would be all but impossible. Examples include electronic 
road pricing, ‘bypass’ immigration based on biometric IDs, ‘virtual’ and competitive 
electricity markets, internet systems where the ‘packets’ of data are individually 
prioritised, online geodemographic  consumption systems, facial recognition closed 
circuit television on city streets, and electronic tagging systems for low-level 
offenders.  Whilst acknowledging the inevitable flexibility associated with software-
sorting techniques, it is therefore apparent that their  widening application needs to 
be seen as a crucial, facilitating dimension in the broad shift from Keynesian welfare 
states  and public domains to ‘splintered’, post-Keynesian regimes of infrastructure, 
service, and space production and consumption (Graham and Marvin, 2001, 
Brenner, 2004).  
 
Lianos (2003, 424) argues that such transitions involve  broader processes of 
desocialisation. In these, discourses or paradigms emphasising universal or quasi-
universal rights of access or consumption, based on Keynesian ideas of citizenship, 
cross-subsidy, monopolistic control, universal service, and electromechanical or 
bureaucratic technologies, are often replaced -- or at least complemented – by new 
software-sorted modalities of power.   Often intensely individualised and 
commodified, the immense transactional flexibility and surveillance power of 
software-sorting means that the essential infrastructures, spaces and services of 
everyday can thus undergo a process of ‘mass-customisation’ (Andrejevic, 2003) or  
widescale ‘unbundling’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001).  
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Very often, then, software-sorting techniques are being used to undermine some of 
the classic characteristics of urban public goods,1  allowing at least some of these 
limits to recommodification to be reconfigured or even swept away (Pinch, 1985). 
Packaged, delivered through consumerist markets, sorted through the endless 
distinctions of geodemographic profiles, and linked closely to the surveillance of 
actual consumer behaviours, market potentials or desires, fully unbundled service 
and access packages thus become possible. Under pressure to maintain or increase 
profits, within  the context of widespread privatisation and liberalisation, service 
packages geared towards more lucrative market niches can thus to be customised 
and ‘splintered’ from the wider societal fabric though software-sorting techniques  
(Graham and Marvin, 2001, Andrejevic, 2003). At the same time, less lucrative users 
of streets, mobility systems, services, electronic communications grids, and places 
can be electronically (and/or physically) pushed away and marginalised, either 
absolutely or relatively, through software-sorting and machinations of code.  
 
Such processes of unbundling can thus allow targeted users to enjoy enhanced 
mobility, reliability, service quality, quality of life, or (real or perceived)  freedom from 
risk, crime, congestion, or contact with (sometimes demonised or humiliated) Others 
(Young, 1999).  "The mobility of some can”, in short, be reconfigured to “immobilise 
others" (Cresswell, 2000, 21). “One person’s infrastructure”  can become “another’s 
                                            
1 These are, first, the concept of 'joint-supply' (or non-rivalness) meaning that if a service, such as the 
national defense or legal system, is supplied to one person, it can also be supplied to all other 
persons at relatively little extra cost. The second concept -- 'non-excludability' -- means that once a 
supply has been built a user can not be prevented from consuming the service (e.g. traditional city 
streets). Third, there is 'non-rejectability'. This means that once a service is supplied it must be 
equally consumed by all, even those who do not wish to consume it  (e.g. public street 
cleaning)(Pinch, 1985) 
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difficulty” (Leigh-Star, 1999, 390). Crucially, however, because most processes of 
software-sorting are actually invisible from the point of the users, these prioritisations 
are often not evident to either the favoured groups or places, or the marginalised 
ones. 
 
III Code Space: Software-Sorted Mobilities 
 
With these points in mind we can turn to our three reviews of particular software-
sorted geographies. Our first – that of software-sorted physical and electronic 
mobility systems --  remains perhaps the least understood and researched. 
Considerable work has been undertaken exploring the ways in which complex 
assemblages of new technologies facilitate and mediate a whole range of mobilities 
(Urry, 2000). The blurring of new media into car systems (Sheller and Urry, 2000, 
Thrift, 2004c), logistics systems (Meyer, 2001), airport systems (Aday, 2004 a,b, 
Dodge and Kitcin, 2004a,b), and street spaces (Andrejevic, 2003) has been 
increasingly reported. However, the specific roles of software-sorting systems in 
shaping social and geographical inequalities in physical and electronic mobility 
systems and spaces  remain only poorly understood.  
 
It is clear that physical mobility systems increasingly utilise powerful software-sorting 
techniques to address imperatives of profit maximisation, social control, or perceived 
risk minimisation. Emerging research by Aday (2004a,b) and Dodge and Kitchen 
(2004a), for example, has successfully revealed the ways in which key physical 
mobility spaces such as airports can only sustain the astonishing transactional 
complexity now expected of them because they are saturated with, and, indeed, 
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constituted through, complex sets of software-sorting and coding systems. 
Importantly, Dodge and Kitchin (2004a, 198) argue that the relationship between 
code and electronic and physical mobility systems like airports is qualitatively 
different from the relationship between code and other types of built of technosocial 
environment. In mobility systems they write that "the relationship between code and 
space is dyadic – code and space are mutually constituted, wherein how the space 
is produced and used is predominantly mediated by code" (original emphasis). 
Dodge and Kitchin use the term ‘code/space’ to describe such environments. This 
they distinguish from ‘coded spaces’ like CCTV-surveilled streets, where code 
remains, thus far, more peripheral to the constitution of the built environment (2004a, 
198). 
 
1 Software-Sorted Airline Mobilities 
 
Taking airports as  paradigmatic ‘code/spaces’ and sites of ubiquitous tracking, it is 
now clear that "the control of international mobilities that cross through airports and 
border zones  are effectively managed, filtered and screened within these sites" 
(Aday, 2004a, 1365, original emphasis). This  work demonstrates that, traditionally, 
the use of machine-readable tags and tickets allowed all human, cargo, baggage 
and worker flows  in and around airport spaces, and, indeed, airline systems, to be 
surveilled, tracked, and socially controlled with a high degree of precision. As 
computerisation of the multiple logistical and transactional systems  involved has 
proceded, so an extending universe of software and code has started to orchestrate 
the burgeoning flows associated with  the global airline system.  
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Importantly, from the point of view of software-sorting and social inequality, Aday 
(2004a) shows that such systems are being augmented by software-sorting systems 
where the identifier of a person is actually biometric – that is, a supposedly unique 
signifier scanned directly from part of the human body (usually a  finger, face or iris 
scan).  Initially – as at Schipol airport’s ‘Privium’ system -- biometrics have been 
used to allow premium, business travellers to bypass conventional border controls. 
Aday argues that the practices and framings of biometric approaches to software-
sorted mobilities are deeply shaped by neoliberal ideologies. In particular, a politics 
of differential speed is established. Biometric techniques are used to "facilitate  the 
ease of speed for trusted, ‘good’ and economically sound business travellers and yet 
impede the flow of ‘bad guys’ or secondary processing – where officers ‘really don’t 
care how long it takes’ to process their entry".(Aday, 2004, 1370).  
 
However, as biometrics shift from elite to mass usage, the prospects of travellers 
who aren’t able to display their body’s signature – ‘illegal’ migrants or asylum 
seekers, for example – worsen considerably. This is because the identification and 
tracking  of such people will become much easier simply because they are subjects 
who attempting to travel around the world’s airline system without their associated 
data image or biometric tag moving through the parallel, coded system.  
 
Compounding the routine racial profiling or air travellers,  which has deepened 
significantly since 9-11, biometric software-sorting techniques necessitate a massive 
global extension of interconnected databases, in order to match the deep association 
of bodies, flows and information at transnational scales. The diffusion of such 
techniques underline the fact that, as Aday concludes, "the airport is now a 
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surveillance machine— an assemblage where webs of technology and information 
combine. Movement, and, increasingly, the body, identity, and objects are made 
legible, momentarily fusing with technology and virtual realism" (2004, 1375). 
 
2 Unbundling Public Roadspace Monopolies: The Quest for ‘Real-Time’ Road 
Pricing 
 
Highway and urban transport systems are facing similar transformations (Graham 
and Marvin, 2001). In a detailed case study of the construction of the world’s largest 
privatised, electronically-charged highway system – the CityLink in Melbourne -- for 
example, David Holmes (2000) has underlined how scarce urban road space can 
become a priced commodity allocated to those who can afford it through software-
sorting techniques. Whilst, like the central London congestion charge, access here is 
controlled through a fixed tariff, in some premium highways in California – for 
example I-15 highway in San Diego – software-sorting can actually display variable 
pricing in real time (Graham and Marvin, 2001, 253). This is based on algorithms 
which estimate exactly the level of price per journey that is likely to deter enough 
drivers to guarantee free-flowing traffic -- no matter how bad the congestion is on the 
surrounding public highway system.   
 
Here we confront software-sorting to guarantee speed, and time saving, to those 
able and willing to pay for technoscientific, urban bypass, using a ‘premium’ 
roadspace, on a per-journey basis. Such techniques herald new inter- and intra-
urban geographies of differential mobility. In these, transponders and private, 
premium road spaces are enrolled, along with the capsular architectures of 
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automobiles themselves, to allow consumerist markets of road space to be 
constructed within, through, and on top of  pre-existing, public roadspace 
monopolies.   
 
More promisingly, software-sorted automobilities may also support broader 
reconfigurations of automobile systems, based on forcing drivers to confront, and 
pay for, the direct social and environmental consequences of their choice  of vehicle. 
If EU proposals for satellite-based charging of all road users are ever implemented,  
for example, software-sorted techniques could conceivably be used to force drivers 
to pay charges based on assessments of the precise environmental externalities of 
their vehicles (see Foley et al, 2003). 
 
3 The Internet: From ‘Best Effort’ to ‘Squelching the Scavenger Class’ 
 
Remarkably similar techniques are also being mobilised, much more discretely, to 
sort people’s access to a whole suite of electronic mobility, communications, and 
service systems (Winseck, 2002). The Internet, for example,  was originally 
developed to accord all  the ‘packets’ of information  that flowed within it equal 
status. This was the so-called ‘best effort’ model of  packet switching where equal 
efforts were made to allow all packets to flow to desired destinations at all times. 
Now, however, the entire Internet is being reengineered into a  corporately controlled 
system of systems dominated by a vast range of commercial services. As Dwayne 
Winseck notes, the technological architectures of the Internet are thus being 
reconfigured: 
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 "by designing networks that put intelligence, resources, and 
capabilities back in the network[…]. Consequently, open network 
architectures are yielding to network designs that enhance network 
providers’ ability to allocate resources, bandwidth, and speed to 
varying types of information and services. This is based on their 
relation to the network owner, revenue potential, class of user 
served, and judgements regarding the quality fo content" (2002, 
182).  
 
In the process, complex software-sorting techniques are now being enrolled, by the 
transnational media firms who run the Internet, to actually sift and prioritise each of 
the billions of data packets that flow over the ‘Net at any one time. Whilst this will 
allow a guaranteed quality of service to premium users and prioritised services, even 
at times of major internet congestion, those packets deemed unprofitable will actually 
be deliberately ‘dropped’, leading to a  dramatic deterioration in the electronic 
mobilities of marginalised users or non-prioritised services (Graham, 2004c).  Such 
strategies are closely linked to the growing corporate control of domestic and mobile 
internet use, where ‘home portals’ and coded cookies establish an increasingly 
commodified regime through which multimedia conglomerates capture personal 
identities, enrolling them into coded geographies of marketing and exchange, often 
without  users' knowledge (Luke, 2002). 
 
Take, for example, the strategy of the most important manufacturer of Internet 
routers, Cisco (2002). They have produced a telling document outlining the centrality 
of software-sorting to the new Internet architectures that they are establishing.  
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Describing how premium internet services can now be offered to what they call the 
"transactional/interactive data class" of users, the document also outlines how the 
electronic mobilities of what they term the "scavenger class" will now be actively 
impeded based on software-sorting of every single Internet packet. "The Scavenger 
class [categorisation]  is intended to provide differential services, or ‘less-than-Best-
Effort"’ services, to certain applications", the document suggests. "Applications 
assigned to this class have little or no contribution to the organizational objectives of 
the enterprize […]. Assigning a minimal bandwidth queue to Scavenger traffic forces 
it to be squelched to virtually nothing during periods of congestion" (Cisco, 2002).  
 
Such techniques might clearly allow the vast volumes on unsolicited spam to be 
systematically marginalised on the Internet. However,  a major concern is that  
Internet users deemed to be insufficiently profitable to serve for whatever reason will 
also face a growing  relative, or absolute, marginalisation, without even being aware 
of it,  as their very packets are actively slowed down or dropped altogether  through 
software-sorting techniques. 
 
Such potent ‘netscapes of power,’  as Winseck (2002) terms them, are completely at 
odds with the widespread surviving perception that the Internet somehow  
intrinsically embodies deeply egalitarian exchange. "Far from being transparent 
means of channelling information from one point to another," writes Winseck, the 
emerging software-sorted Internet  networks "are technologies of discrimination that 
regulate information flows according to fine-grained criteria set by network owners. In 
essence gatekeeping functions have been hardwired into network architectures as 
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part of the communication industries’ strategies to cultivate and control markets" 
(2002, 1820). 
 
Similar software-sorting techniques have also been shown to shape the results 
produced by supposedly unbiased search engines in ways that favour the affiliates of 
the transnational media conglomerates who own search engine companies (Introna 
and Nissenbaum, 2000). Moreover, as mobile phones emerge as peripatetic 
appliances mediating user’s relationships with geographic and city spaces and 
services, so they, too, are opening up whole new realms of software-sorting 
(Andrejevic, 2003). Here, such techniques promise to customise ‘mobile commerce’ 
services to detailed records of an individual’s own consumption and mobility habits, 
targeting advertising spam for goods and services that are geographically and 
geodemeographically appropriate, as the user moves around the city. Individually 
tailored city maps will be directly customised to software records of users’ 
consumption habits. Andrejevic  points out that "time-space paths will be used as a 
strategy for customisation. Advertising and marketing appeals will be directed to 
consumers based on where they are in time and space." This, he believes, will usher 
in "a radical departure from the productive disciplinary surveillance associated with 
the institution of mass society (2003, 134). 
 
4 Call Centres: The Politics of Differential Queuing  
 
In our final example of software-sorted electronic mobilities, it is becoming apparent 
that even call centre telephone queues are now being differentially sorted based on 
value judgements about callers’ economic value as customers (Graham, 2004c). 
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Because call centres can detect the telephone numbers of incoming calls, and 
instantly check these against customer and geodemographic databases, they can 
use software-sorting techniques to queue ‘good customers’ for much shorter times 
than ‘bad’ customers.  
 
"One of your best customers dials the national customer service number for your 
company", gushes the scenario in a marketing brochure from the Avaya Corporation 
(2000). "The ANI [Automatic Number Identification] database reveals the customer to 
be among the top 5% of your customers. [Our system] routes the customer at high 
priority. When the agent picks up the call, he hears a whispered announcement that 
this caller is ‘Top 5’" (2000, 3)(sic.). 
 
IV  Code Place: Software-Sorted Cities 
 
A substantial body of research has revealed the importance of geographical 
information and geodemographic systems  (GIS’s and GDIS’s) in shaping the 
production and consumption of contemporary urban spaces (Goss, 1995, Curry, 
1998, Phillips and Curry, 2002). With their tendency to exaggerate and reify 
homogeneously constructed ‘ideal type’ neighbourhoods profiles, and so to ossify 
spatial and social classifications, such techniques have been widely shown to 
underpin redlining and socially regressive location decision making and service 
planning (Pickles, 1995).  
 
1 Geographic Information Systems as Urban Surveillant-Simulations 
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GIS’s and GDIS’s do indeed provide powerful urban software-sorting devices. Here 
code is used to both surveil the social geographies of cities and provide the means 
to construct powerful, and often highly biased, simulations and visualisations of 
those geographies (Graham, 1998). Unlike the software-sorted mobility systems just 
discussed -- and those operating on public streets that we shall shortly address --  
geodemographic systems do not, yet, offer real-time mediations of cities and urban 
life.  Rather, they are systems of surveillance and simulation that rely on what 
Phillips and Curry have called a "phenetic fix.’ Linked to locational referencing, 
postcode data bases, mobile and electronic commerce systems, and geopositioning 
networks, this palimpsest of code is increasingly determinate in support self-
reinforcing spatial categorisations. In the process, "databases become increasingly 
determinate: you become where you live" (Amin and Thrift, 2002, 45).  
 
Thus the city thus itself becomes a software-based simulation, a fine-grained 
dynamic map of consumption and spending potential, as the large geodemographic 
bureaux  now attempt to capture more and more direct consumption information into 
GIS-based  ‘data warehouses’  from store credit cards, credit bureaux, direct 
marketing campaigns, Internet responses and the like (Graham, 1998). Goss (1995) 
outlines how such GIS-based systems become transformed from  partial 
representations and simulations of some putative ‘reality,’ to effectively operate as 
reality itself,  the basis for  precise locational decision making and profit-driven 
targeting within large retailers : 
"the GDIS (Geo-Demograpic Information Systems) is literally 
represented as a  construction, a ‘built environment’ consistent, of 
course, with the architectonic metaphors so pervasive in the discourse 
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on information technology. This architectonic metaphor effectively 
gives substance to a  language, reifying the binary code that 
represents information as an alternate world, literally a data ‘structure’ 
[...]  The abstract data structure is then anchored to a direct 
representation of reality, which leads to the conceit that the world of 
the GDIS is itself another reality [...].A representation of the ‘exteriority’ 
of the world is interiorized on the computer" (Goss, 1995; 143-4) 
 
2 On-Line GIS, Software-Sorting, and the Remediation of Neighbourhoods 
 
Crucially, however, Roger Burrows and Nick Ellison (2004) have demonstrated that 
the reach and power of GDIS is now extending to directly shape the consumption of 
neighbourhoods, the processes of individual and collective identity formation, and 
the dynamics of housing markets and educational systems, in extremely powerful 
ways. Increasingly, GDIS and GIS-based representations of city spaces are directly 
mediating the consumption of place through software-sorting systems that can be 
accessed directly by consumers. Burrows and Ellison (2004, 326) argue that "the 
informatization of neighbourhood consumption that online GIS websites of various 
sorts make available the informational resources by which strategically inclined 
social groups are able to find ‘their’ place within complex and dynamic urban spaces" 
(2004, 326).  
 
As GIS emerge to dramatically remediate  the consumption of housing, education 
and all manner of geographically specific services and attributes (at least for such 
‘strategically inclined’ groups), so the processes of neighbourhood informatization 
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take a crucial new turn. Comprehensive national web sites like upmystreet.com in 
the UK provide powerful postcode-based searching devices through which coded 
algorithms deliver multidimensional analyses of everything from crime rates, school 
performance, house prices, environmental quality and hazards, pollution, and access 
to services. Customised maps and aerial photographs can be accessed, and virtual 
communities of ‘like minded’ people living in the neighbourhood can be accessed. In 
the USA such processes have gone even further. Using web sites like 
homestore.com, people considering moves can automatically sort through 
metropolitan social geographies to find neighbourhoods with the social and 
demographic profiles that most closely ‘match’ those of heir current location.  
 
The current saturation of urban environments with a vast universe of tracking 
systems means that, very soon, dynamic and real-time geographical simulations of 
urban places will be accessible over the Internet. These attempt to match the social 
and demographic fluctuations of real places over various temporal scales (Burrows 
and Ellison, 2004, 329). Once such ‘tracking’ – of people, vehicles, consumption 
habits, and digital interactions – becomes routine, software-sorting techniques will 
move beyond crude, generalised, and ‘lumpy’ simulations of places accessible over 
PCs, to offer real-time and fluctuating  simulations to mobile and hand-held 
computers based on the real time-space flux of urban mobilities.  Such systems will 
allow individuals to be "aggregated with that of other proximate mobile individuals in 
order to construct fleeting geodemographic characterizations of any particular 
configuration of people in any particular place" (Burrows and Ellison, 2004, 329).  
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As a result of such applications, it is now clear that the social politics of place, and 
the geographies of urban inequality, are being directly mediated by the sorting and 
simulation capabilities of online geodemographic software. The individual and 
collective preferences, and identities, of subjects are starting to impact upon the 
geographies of inequality through their active engagement with software-sorting 
systems. Through such systems "privileged social actors increasingly affect the 
social and political patterning and characteristics – and social politics – of their 
chosen neighbourhoods" (Burrows and Ellison, 2004, 334). Online GIS are being 
used to negotiate the social geography of cities. Such systems: 
 "strategically substitut[e]  online search capacity for what was hitherto 
intuition […]. The use of information for ostensibly consumption and 
lifestyle goals will transform the contours of social citizenship. 
Essentially, individuals who are privileged in this way can be expected 
to separate themselves increasingly from a dependence of goods and 
services produced for collective ends – and, by extension, from the 
responsibilities that accompany these forms of collective consumption" 
(330).  
 
Thus, as online GIS support a consumerisation of the consumption and production of 
urban social geographies, the real concern is that such processes will further support 
an unbundling of notions of universal urban citizenship that elsewhere, in my book 
with Simon Marvin, I have termed a process of ‘splintering’ urbanism (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001). Individualised, online-GIS based decisions and behaviour, based on 
self identities and reflective, lifestyle choices, are likely to allow socially powerful 
groups to further their secession from the wider space-times of the city, as they seek 
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to locate in, and consume, the privileged, best serviced and highest amenity 
neighbourhoods. The algorithms that support such choices, simulations,  orderings, 
and classifications – the very guts of online GIS systems – meanwhile remain 
completely opaque and utterly unscrutinised. Moreover, "aside from the initial 
programming of these systems and the naming of the classifications they use, there 
is little human agency at play in their day-to-day operation" (Burrows and  Gane, 
2004, 29)  
 
When added to the proliferation of privatised mobility infrastructures and defensive, 
gated, private communities in many cities, the predominant  use of online GIS by 
relatively affluent, powerful and technologically literate groups seem likely to provide 
new ‘secessionary networked spaces’ (Graham and Marvin, 2001). These seem 
likely to work to further undermine concepts of universalised, redistributive politics 
based on integrative and public notions of city governance operating to ameliorate 
social inequalities across metropolitan scales.  This is particularly so as marginalised 
subjects and communities in cities often remain largely unable to engage in the 
online GIS that are so rapidly remediating the production and consumption of urban 
places for more affluent. groups "Lacking the requisite virtual and material resources, 
these groups are less able to shape forms of social politics capable of protecting, let 
alone extending, the public services and accompanying collectivist ideologies on 
which they continue to depend" (Burrow and Ellison, 204, 335). Such conclusions, 
however, must remain speculative because very little research has actually yet been 
done on the ways in which online GIS systems are influencing the production, 
consumption and experience of geographies of urban inequality.  
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V  Code Face: Software-Sorted Streets 
 
Our final exploration of the extension of software-sorting techniques addresses the 
proliferation of ‘algorithmic’ closed circuit television systems, covering city streets 
and public places, which attempt to automatically recognise peoples' faces using 
inputted image databases. Building on the massive and rapid diffusion of analogue 
CCTV, which relies on the (expensive) ‘MK1 eyeball’ of human operators scanning 
monitors and recording footage using banks of domestic-style video recorders, a 
major effort is now being made to install much cheaper, automated, facial 
recognition, or ‘event-driven,’ CCTV in the place of such systems (Norris and 
Armstrong, 1999). Often such systems take advantage of the installation of 
broadband and internet infrastructures with their ready multimedia capabilities. The 
‘surveillance surge’ that has followed the 9/11 attacks, as a vast ‘security-industrial 
complex’ has attempted to sell ‘silver bullet’ technologised solutions to the perceived 
fears of ‘terrorism,’ has added further momentum to the digitisation of CCTV (Zureik, 
2004, Lyon, 2004, Gray, 2003).  
 
1 The Face as Bar-Code: Face-Recognition CCTV and the Automation of Street 
Surveillance 
 
In digital, facial recognition CCTV, the software-sorting process involves the inputting 
of the facial, biometric imagery of a ‘target’ population which computer algorithms 
then actively seek out.  Crucially, this inputting tends to go on without the subject’s 
consent: "unlike other biometrics [facial recognition CCTV] can operate anonymously 
in the background" (Koskela, 2003, 2). The code within the facial recognition system 
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becomes a key political site because its operation automatically stipulates the 
subjects, locations or behaviours that are deemed by the operators to be ‘abnormal’, 
‘threatening’ and worthy of further scrutiny or tracking.  
 
As well as stipulating the digitised signatures of ‘target’ faces, software-based CCTV 
can also be programmed to search for  the signature walking styles that are deemed 
to be most often used by those committing criminal acts, for the number plates of 
suspect cars, even -- when linked with microphones or smelling sensors --  for 
stipulated, suspect, sounds or smells  (Hook, 2001). One report on the growth of 
such automated, ‘intelligent’, detection systems, from a leading CCTV industry 
representative, explains the process through which software is designed to ‘target’ 
apparently ‘abnormal’ behaviours, presences, and people, bluntly. "Recognising 
aberrant behaviour", it writes, "is for a scientist a matter of grouping expected 
behaviour and writing an algorithm that recognises any deviation from the ‘normal’" 
(Hook, 2001, 20).  
 
The social politics of software-sorting are rarely described so succinctly. The report 
continues to describe how pattern-recognition and neural software could be 
embedded within facial recognition CCTV to support a much wider automated search 
for the supposed signifiers of social pathology. "If the sensors were to ‘see’ a leg 
moving back and forward but the torso remaining still," it continues, "that might 
suggest that someone was kicking something rather than just walking along. Equally, 
a milling crowd where none was expected or rapid movements of an arm might also 
trigger an alarm in the system" (Hook, 2001, 20). 
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The fact that coded algorithms can automatically monitor vastly larger domains of 
time and space, and dramatically larger CCTV camera networks, than human 
operators adds to the sense that it represents a step-change in the power of CCTV 
(Graham and Wood, 2003). There are very real risks that the multiple ‘islands’ of 
private and public CCTV systems, each monitored by its own human operators, 
could quickly merge into much more massive and geographically-stretched facial 
recognition CCTV systems. Potentially, these could operate to exploit transnational 
divisions of labour, with operators, and their software-sorting systems, on the other 
side of the world from the CCTV ‘eyes’ themselves . Software-sorting techniques 
provide scope to realise the clear economies of scale and scope that the obvious 
limits of human operation have, thus far, made impossible (Graham, 2002). 
 
The proliferation of such systems raises a host of crucial political, social and ethical 
questions. The possible connections between facial recognition CCTV and the 
geographies of inequality are particularly worrying.  What happens, asks Phil Agre 
(2003), when a person’s face becomes a sort of ‘bar-code’ that is captured without 
their permission, and integrated into vast data bases allowing extending and 
interconnecting facial recognition systems, potentially, to track their movements 
continuously? "As the technology advances", writes Mitchell Gray (2003, 216), the 
clear risk is that "the software will effortlessly track individuals moving through urban 
space, public and private. Any appearance of a person deemed threatening can be 
set to trigger an alarm, assuming that that person’s face has been recorded in a 
linked database".  
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However, such fears must be balanced by the  real problems involved in making 
face-recognition CCTV work on city streets even at a very local scale. Most trials of 
facial recognition CCTV have tended to operate within the narrow obligatory passage 
points of airport security checks and access control systems. Translating such 
systems to the open and extremely porous  domains of city street systems -- with 
people’s facial images complicated by multiple angles, weather conditions, levels of 
light, changing facial appearances, and human ageing --  is a major headache for 
digital CCTV operators. Early evidence from one of the first facial recognition CCTV 
systems in the world, the ‘Facit’ system at Newham in East London, certainly 
suggests that Ist generations of the technology, at least, rarely identify stipulated 
individuals effectively in open street situations (Meek, 2002). However, since this 
system was installed, major technological progress has ensued, although, as of 2003 
"the ability to match a  face in a crowd [was] still elusive" (Norris, 2003, 271). 
 
2  “A Biology of Culpability” : Embedding Prejudice into Code?  
 
Importantly, the potential for effective recognition also varies heavily between 
different social or ethnic groups. An analysis by Lucas Introna of one trial of various 
trials of facial recognition CCTV systems concludes, for example, that "for the top 
systems […] identification rates for males were 6% to 9% points higher than for 
females[…]. Recognition rates for older people were higher than for younger people" 
(2003, 20). Moreover, Introna quotes the official report evaluating the trial which 
confirms that "Asians are easier [to recognise] than whites, African-Americans are 
easier than whites, [and] other race members are easier than whites" (FRVT, 2002, 
8)(sic.). Incorporated in to complex, ongoing software-sorting CCTV systems, the 
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potential for such discrepancies to be translated into major geographical and social 
inequalities is clearly immense. 
 
Three prime concerns arise here. First, there is the question of the invisibility of 
operation and design of such systems. Introna and Wood (2004) argue that the 
apparently mundane design decisions that go into facial recognition CCTV systems, 
and the code embedded in them, need to be opened up to scrutiny. They argue  that 
the 'silent’, passive and utterly invisible code within face recognition CCTV systems -
- where even the location of the software-sorting process may be far from the gaze 
of the cameras – must be made visible if the configurations  and implications of such 
software-sorting processes are to be exposed. This is a prerequisite, they argue, if 
any hope can be sustained that such systems can be brought under any form of 
democratic scrutiny and regulation (Introna and Wood, 2004, 195). The great fear, 
Introna and Wood argue, is that the racial, social or gender biases reported amongst 
operators of manual CCTV systems (see Norris and Armstrong, 1999), may be 
directly translated  into the  very facial recognition algorithms that are the basis for 
the software-sorting process. 
 
Second, Mitchell Gray (2003) argues that facial recognition CCTV systems 
decontextualise the behaviour of human subjects from their observation or detection. 
They remove the contingency of discretion and local knowledge that once 
characterised the way human law enforcement personnel decided whether to use 
sanctions of force (Koskela, 2003, Norris, 2003). And they threaten to open the door 
to a widening universe of algorithmically policed systems which detect the supposed  
biometric or digital signifiers of social or individual pathology at a more or less 
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considerable distance, as defined by a  highly dubious set of ‘scientific’ sub-
disciplines who have much to gain from the ubiquitous application of these 
technologies. Nikolas Rose (2000), referring to the emerging biocriminology which 
links code, surveillance, and genetic or biometric detection, calls  this an emerging 
"biology of culpability."  Here Gray (2003, 325) notes that micro-expression detectors 
are already being developed within the US military to detect ‘unusual expressions’ 
not supposedly associated with their location of behaviour.  
 
Finally, there are grave dangers that algorithmically controlled CCTV systems might 
work to deepen already establish ecologies of normalization, and demonization, 
within neoliberal urban landscapes of power. Exaggerating logics of exclusion 
against ‘failed consumers,’ the young, refugees/asylum seekers, or other demonised 
minorities, within the increasingly polarised landscapes of contemporary cities, these 
very logics could, conceivably, be embedded in biases within the very code that 
makes facial recognition CCTV systems work (see Reeve, 1996).  Indeed, it is 
conceivable that such biometric and individualised systems could destroy the 
anonymised interactions that have long been central characteristics of city spaces. A 
new ontology of the body could be ushered in which uses software-sorting 
techniques to continuously police and stipulate notions of the purported value, 
fitness, riskiness, worth and legality of subjects, based on the continuous scanning of 
a whole suite of biometric signatures, as people move  within and between city 
spaces (Van der Ploeg, 1999).  
 
To Phil Agre (2001), such a shift would could usher in a "tremendous change in our 
society’s conception of the human person. People would find strangers addressing 
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them by name" in previously anonymised encounters in city streets and commercial 
spaces. More worrying still, normalised, commercial judgements, based on 
continuous connections to credit registers and the like, could connect very closely 
processes of consumer marginalisation to this new logic of personalised monitoring 
(Agre, 2001, 3).  
 
VI  Conclusions: Towards a Spatial Politics of Code 
 
This paper has sought to underline the centrality of software-sorting in structuring 
contemporary social and geographical inequalities. It has also attempted to illustrate 
the need to maintain a broad, multisectoral perspective which can capture how 
different software-sorting techniques are encroaching across different dimensions of 
contemporary societies. Given the  limited space available here, I would like to finish 
by  briefly underlining four central questions raised by this discussion. 
 
First, it is very clear from this discussion that software-sorting must be at the centre 
of any attempt to conceptualise the formation, maintenance  and experience of  
social and geographical inequalities within contemporary capitalist societies. A 
pressing imperative for human geography, in particular, is to fully address, and 
excavate,  the power of code and software-sorting techniques in continually 
orchestrating the geographies of  contemporary inequality.  Software-sorting 
techniques are diffusing rapidly to mediate the production, consumption and 
experience of physical and electronic mobility systems and spaces, urban 
neighbourhoods, a whole plethora of service, finance, and communication systems, 
and even city streets. So powerful and invisible have such domains of technosocial 
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power become that geographers and other social scientists addressing social 
inequality will surely face nothing short of a paradigm crisis of irrelevance if they do 
not address  them with much more sophistication, energy and urgency than they 
have done hitherto. As Amin and Thrift suggest, software-sorting techniques "are 
becoming one of the chief ways of animating the city. They must not be allowed to 
take us unaware" (Amin and Thrift, 2002, 128).  
 
It is therefore time for a concerted, multidisciplinary effort to try and open up the 
‘black boxes’ that trap software-sorting, and the cultural and spatial politics of code, 
within their esoteric, largely unknown, and almost completely opaque, technocratic 
worlds (Eischen, 2003). For, crucially, software-sorting practices "must become 
transparent if we are to evaluate critically the politics of mobility," as well as those of 
inequality, citizenship, the city, and the body, more generally (Aday, 2004a, 1377). 
 
This paper has begun to demonstrate how, through the application of  software-
sorting techniques, whole swathes of the social and public realms of cities, and  the 
essential private and pubic service domains of advanced industrial nations, are 
rapidly being ‘mass customised’, unbundled, commodified, individualised, and co-
ordinated through networked technologies linking scales from the globe to the body. 
Very often, this is being accomplished based on  combinations of neoliberal, 
consumeristic principles and ideologies  of governance, new technological 
assemblages, and intensifying surveillance capabilities. In post-Keynesian, 
neoliberal contexts, it is clear that software-sorting techniques provide critical political 
sites. This is especially so as, currently, they are being overwhelmingly implemented 
to address perceived  imperatives amongst service providers of offering favoured 
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groups and places enhanced services, rights and mobilities, and improved real or 
perceived security, whilst, very often, working directly to undermine the prospects of 
marginalised groups and communities. 
 
Second, whilst the vague contours of software-sorted geographies outlined here are, 
indeed, now starting to become apparent, a whole range of  vitally important 
research questions remain virtually unaddressed. In what ways,  for example, do the 
inequalities that are constantly and automatically produced through software-sorting 
map on to the more familiar geographies and spatialities of inequality within and 
between contemporary cities? How do multiple systems of software-sorting interact 
and combine together? Do their redistributive effects multiply through positive 
feedback loops to favour  and disfavour broadly the same individuals, groups and 
places? Do such compound effects reinforce broader trends that have been 
identified towards the ‘splintering’ of the sociotechnical and geographical fabric of 
contemporary cities (Graham and Marvin, 2001). If so, might this herald the onset, as 
Lieven de Cauter (2004) has termed it, of a sort of "capsular civilisation" dominated 
by the cultures and biopolitics of (attempted) separation, a vast infrastructure of 
continuous, digital filtering and tracking, and the cultural politics of fear? Or do these 
effects work in more complex and contraditory ways, as they interact with the more 
subtly biased practices that, I would argue,  have tended to mark the service cultures 
of Keynesian and electromechanical  service regimes?  
 
A second group of key research questions surround the subjectivities of service use 
and mobility within software-sorted domains. How, for example, do such techniques 
influence the identities, experiences, affect and perceptions of those on the receiving 
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end of software-sorting? Does the varying level of (in)visibility amongst such 
techniques -- for example between relatively invisible electronic mobility systems and 
relatively visible city street and physical transport systems -- affect such subjectivities 
and experiences?  
 
A final group of research questions emerge when we consider the linkages between  
the widespread implementation of software-sorting systems and the extending 
spatial divisions of labour and mobility within neoliberal capitalism more broadly. 
What, for example, are the geographies of production, diffusion and operation of the 
vast universe of software-sorting systems now being implemented? How are they 
enmeshed within broader transnational divisions of labour within information and 
data processing industries and how are their ‘front’ and ‘back-office’ elements, linking 
the points of data capture to the moments of algorithmic judgement,  geographically 
structured? How do software-sorted systems influence the broader geographies of 
mobility and development, as their embedded algorithms mediate larger and larger 
parts of the transnational geographies of production, distribution and consumption? 
What are the broader political geographies of production, consumption, regulation 
and governance of software-sorted service domains?  Finally, how are the social and 
normative judgements, and inclusions, that form the heart of these systems  altered 
and adapted as they diffuse between different geographical, social and sectoral sites 
and contexts?  
 
Our third  critical conclusion concerns the practicalities and epistemologies of social 
research on software-sorting. How, for example, can social and geographical 
research aimed at excavating the social  and spatial politics of code, and the impacts 
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of software-sorting techniques on the production and experience of inequalities,  best 
progress? Given the opaque, fast-moving and deeply arcane nature of this crucial 
new realm of produced inequalities, how can social and geographical research hope 
to genuinely address this challenge? Given the inevitably confidential, proprietary 
and highly technical nature of the core algorithms that now socially-sort so many key 
social domains, what research techniques and paradigms can offer any genuine 
assistance here? Clearly, the research challenges here are truly immense. This is 
especially so given that, from the point of view of social geographic research, the 
worlds of software-sorting tend not to be amenable in any meaningful way to 
traditional geographical or social scientific research techniques and 
conceptualisations (Thrift and French, 2002). 
 
This paper’s final conclusion raises the critical question of appropriate political 
responses to the spatial politics of software-sorting. How can regulation, policy and 
resistance address the rapid and multi-scaled diffusion of automated software-
sorting techniques across contemporary societies? When such techniques tend to 
rely on their true opacity, invisibility, and topological configuration to elude any real 
attempts at public regulation from polities which are necessarily jurisdictionally-
embedded, how can states and policy makers begin to respond? In what ways can 
policy makers, in the diverse reams now affected, truly gain knowledge of, and 
leverage over, the software-sorting techniques that are embedded at the heart of the 
emerging inequalities?  What policy instruments might best address these fast-
moving domains, bringing standards, transparency, and democratic oversight where 
at present there exists a universe of unfettered, ‘frontier’ technoscience? Can such 
policy makers avoid the ever-deepening encroachment of software-sorted 
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techniques, and the resulting emergence of societies where a universe of electronic 
code continually works to imprint neoliberal and consumerist logics-- with virtual 
invisibility -- on to a growing proportion of social and economic exchanges? And, 
finally,  what scope is there for creative resistance through which social movements, 
activists, and participatory technological spaces, can work to infiltrate and expose 
the inequities that are being digitally encoded into such routine, but essential, 
transactions?  
 
This latter point exposes an especially promising area of  geographical action and 
policy research. For the inherent flexibility of software-sorting techniques opens up 
important normative questions as to how they can be shaped progressively to 
sustain empowering innovations and restructurings in service regimes, rather than 
the more usual and often highly inequitable processes of consumerisation, 
splintering and commodification that have been the main concern of this paper. 
Participatory, online GIS systems offer an interesting example here. The 
Neighborhood Knowledge Los Angeles (NKLA) initiative, for example, has 
successfully exposed the geographic data sets used to systematically red-line 
deteriorating neighbourhoods in LA. – a major boost to social movements working to 
publicly regulate these processes (see http://nkla.ucla.edu/). Another good example 
of the progressive potential of software-sorting  involves the construction of 
household surveillance systems which ‘learn’ about the habits and routines of elderly 
or disabled people living in their homes, use algorithms to judge when these have 
been significantly departed from, and  then automatically alert emergency services.2  
And finally, software-sorting techniques could be invaluable in re-engineering road 
                                            
2  See http://marc.med.virginia.edu/library_techrev.html (accessed February 2005). 
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transport systems, based on environmental sustainability principles,  so that heavy 
polluters were forced to pay relatively high amounts for their use of the road system 
(Foley et al, 2003). 
 
In addressing this wide research, policy and activist agenda, the challenge is to 
maintain a critical and informed position without falling foul of dystopian and 
absolutist scenarios suggesting that software-sorting techniques are somehow 
limitless, completely integrated, and all-powerful. As Koskella (2003) suggests, 
"urban space will always remain less knowable and, thus, less controllable than the 
restricted panoptic space". Spaces which escape the reach of  regressive software-
sorting systems do and will  remain. A politics of transgressing, resisting, and even 
dismantling such increasingly inequitable systems is possible. Software-sorting 
techniques also offer much potential for progressive and empowering policy 
innovations. And, crucially, as Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift put it, the: 
 "networks of control that snake their way through cities are necessarily 
oligoptic, not panoptic: they do not fit together. They will produce 
various spaces and times, but they cannot fill out the whole space of the 
city – in part because they cannot reach everywhere, in part because 
they therefore cannot know all spaces and times, and in part because 
many new spaces and times remain to be invented" (2002, 128). 
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